Denis Dutchak
The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine has not approved the acquisition of 30% of the Ukrainian defense-tech company Fire Point by the Arab defense group EDGE Group and returned the application. The application was submitted on December 30, 2025, and as of early March 2026, there had been no repeated appeal to the committee. The potential deal involves an investment of $760 million by the EDGE Group fund from the UAE.
Main points
- The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine did not approve the acquisition of 30% of the Ukrainian company Fire Point by the Arab EDGE Group due to the lack of a system for managing foreign investments in the defense sector.
- The deal could threaten national security by giving the investor access to critical technologies, highlighting the need for FDI screening to protect strategic assets.
Denis Dutchak
The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine has not approved the acquisition of 30% of the Ukrainian defense-tech company Fire Point by the Arab defense group EDGE Group and returned the application. The application was submitted on December 30, 2025, and as of early March 2026, there had been no repeated appeal to the committee. The potential deal involves an investment of $760 million by the EDGE Group fund from the UAE.
Fire Point is one of the largest Ukrainian manufacturers of long-range drones and missiles. In 2024, the company's revenue amounted to 4.3 billion hryvnias, and in the first quarter of 2025 – 2.6 billion. The company's flagship products include the FP-1 and FP-2 drones, the Flamingo cruise missile, and promising missile developments. Read more in an exclusive column for Channel 24.
And although formally the AMCU acted in accordance with procedures, the real problem is deeper: Ukraine still does not have a clear system for managing foreign investments in the defense sector. As a result, large international investors can gain access to strategically important data of Ukrainian companies, which significantly increases the risk of losing critical technologies.
Minority investment and negative control
At first glance, it may seem that 30% of shares do not give the right to influence strategic decisions. But in the field of defense technologies this is not so. Even a share of 10-15% often gives the owner of these shares the opportunity for “negative control”: the ability to block key decisions regarding the strategic development of the enterprise, the appointment of management, and production priorities.
In the case of Fire Point, this means that the investor receives not only a share of the profits, but also potential access to all the company's developments – from drawings and algorithms to production processes and engineering solutions. In fact, we are talking about technologies that are of critical defense value to the state.
Technology as a key asset
Fire Point doesn't just manufacture equipment. It's a company whose core value lies in technology. They create products without which the country's modern defense infrastructure would be incomplete.
Of course, EDGE Group's multi-million dollar investment could give Fire Point the financial resources to scale production, enter new markets, expand production capacities, and possibly partially relocate production outside of Ukraine. But the main risk lies in who will gain access to the developments and how these technologies can be used.
In the absence of a mechanism for vetting foreign investments, an investor may gain control over inventions that can be exported, copied, or used outside of Ukraine without formal permission from the State Export Control Service. This is a potential loss of a strategic national security asset.
Lesson “Motor Sich”
We already had the example of Motor Sich. At that time, Chinese investors (in particular, Skyrizon) tried to acquire a company that produces critical aircraft engines and transfer production and technology to China. This directly threatened Ukraine's interests due to China's ties with Russia.
Due to the threat of losing control over a strategic enterprise and questionable transactions, the shares of the Chinese company were seized, and later the Motor Sich enterprise was transferred to state ownership.
This situation demonstrated that the legal form of the agreement does not guarantee the security of the technology. Even a minority stake can be a way to gain access to critical information.
About the role of the AMCU
Ukraine still does not have an effective mechanism for verifying foreign investments in strategic areas, while in developed countries this is done through FDI screening. Its essence is to assess potential risks to national security and critical sectors in order to identify and, if necessary, limit or prohibit investments that may threaten important technologies, infrastructure, or intellectual property.
Since FDI screening has not yet been implemented in Ukraine, the role of the first line of risk assessment has effectively been taken over by the AMCU. The return of EDGE Group's application was most likely not due to formal shortcomings, but due to an understanding of the potential threat to the state.
Military technology is a national security asset. Its transfer or uncontrolled access can have unpredictable geopolitical consequences.
Any transfer or potential access to secret developments and inventions must go through the State Export Control and law enforcement agencies. Giving the investor the opportunity to influence the company's decisions can become a form of quasi-export of unique technologies.
What is the solution?
- Full-fledged FDI screening is an effective mechanism for verifying investors and final beneficiaries, with an assessment of the risks of access to strategic inventions.
- The state needs to clearly identify defense developments, access to which should be limited or strictly regulated.
- Structuring deals. Namely, restrictions on voting rights, special terms of corporate agreements, or separation of business lines so that the investor does not gain control over key decisions and developments.
In the field of defense technologies, the priority should not be funding, but control. Money can be found, partners can be changed, but lost technologies cannot be returned.
Every Defense Tech investment decision must begin with a simple but critically important question: who will gain access to key technologies and who will guarantee their security?
As long as there are no clear rules, every deal becomes a balance between development and risk. And the price of a mistake for the state and national security can be too high.
The column is the author's personal opinion; the editorial staff of Channel 24 may not share it.