Seven levels of war. Continuation of war through cease-fire

The model of "seven levels of war" was initially conceived in 2014 by the "Civil erational Headquarters" strategic think tank before being updated by Valerii Pekar and Andrii Dligach in May 2021.

Currently, the seven-level confrontation is undergoing tectonic shifts caused by a reshuffle in the pitical elite and a systemic approach on the part of the United States. The Democratic Party in the U.S. lost both the presidential election and those to the House and Senate. Therefore, the picy pursued by the United States, one of the key actors on the planet, will definitely change.

A year before Russia unleashed its full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the chief of US National Intelligence, Avril Haynes, unveiled a systemic outlook until 2040. More than three years after the concept was presented, it is possible to see which of the five projected scenarios is develing.

Now, given the pragmatic and isationist steps that international experts expect from the administration of President-elect Donald Trump, something in between the two scenarios "A world adrift" and "Separate silos" is unfding.

The global system becomes chaotic, losing its priorities and clear directions. Governments tend to ignore international rules and appeals voiced by international organizations. Economic develment is slowing down, while the atomization of communities is increasing. Against the background of the failure of Western democracies to prerly respond to emerging challenges, China is expanding its influence. The world is becoming fragmented into several economic and security blocs of varying size and strength, centered in the U.S., China, the EU, Russia, and India. International trade chains are being reoriented, and information circulates mostly in separated cyber clusters. The countries in the so-called non-Western world are forced to either make dramatic and risky choices in favor of their respective “world leader”, or suffer from minor inclusion in the global commercial and media space.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that intelligence agencies around the world demonstrate an extremely poor strategic capacity, given that we are looking into scenarios they have once drafted.

Some six months ago, the discussion of the war in Ukraine was limited to issues of maintaining the status quo at the frontlines until Russia's capabilities are exhausted and they can no longer sustain a war effort at the same level of intensity (stalemate or war of attrition).

Nowadays, more and more discussions focus on Ukraine needing to make a hard choice. It’s either continuing the horrific war for an indefinite period, remaining within the conservative scenario of awaiting Russia’s depletion (which seems unrealistic, given Russia's continued profiting off hydrocarbon trade) or preparing the general public, which has grown used to victorious narratives over the last three years, for difficult compromises and territorial concessions, which will be flowed by even more challenging work to keep fighting the hybrid war and brace for a new Russian offensive, which will come in the horizon of seven to 10 years.

So where are we at the moment?

Level 1: The fight of Ukrainian identity for its future

At the Valdai Forum on November 4-7, 2024, the moderator asked Vladimir Putin about the borders within which Russia would recognize Ukraine.

In fact, the answer to that question earlier came from one of the chiefs of Ukraine’s Patr Pice, legendary "cyborg" war veteran Yevhen Zhukov (call sign "Marshal"). He said Russia's borders are defined “wherever the Russian army can get their a** kicked”.

However, Putin offered a different answer, claiming Russia had recognized Ukraine within the framework of the 1991 agreements, but at that time the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine laid down Ukraine’s non-aligned status. As per Putin, Russia recognized the borders of Ukraine in direct connection with that pitical statement.

Putin is likely referring to the clause which states that "The Ukrainian SSR declares its intention to become a permanently neutral state in the future, which does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three non-nuclear principles: no to accept, not to produce, and not to acquire nuclear weapons."

Later, Putin argues, Ukraine amended its Constitution, adding a clause on the nation’s desire to join NATO, without asking Putin's permission. "But a deal’s a deal…" says the Russian dictator. At the same time, the international criminal as per the International Criminal Court seems to have forgot that constitutional amendments regarding Euro-Atlantic integration came as a result of unprovoked military aggression and the annexation of Crimea, a gross viation of the norms of the Budapest Memorandum, which both Moscow, Washington, and London simply ignored.

Obviously, the issue of Ukraine's neutrality will be brought up for discussion between Western and Russian pitical elites. In his speech and in other media appearances, Putin constantly stresses his vision that the full-scale aggression and killing of civilians in Ukraine’s rear is only a fraction of Russia's broader confrontation with the "global West", which undermines Russia’s develment and "has deceived" Putin personally.

At the same time, the so-called "global West" refuses to recognize its direct participation in this war, which suits both the West and the Kremlin. An example of such a successful synergy is the election campaign of Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who, with the help of his Republican spin doctor George Birnbaum, once launched a "hy war" against George Soros (the latter never showed up for that war though). As a result of Orbán "defeating" an imaginary ponent in the eyes of his voters, he eventually became prime minister while Soros's portunities in Hungary were massively curtailed.

Still, the Democrats Party seem to have learned no lessons from that story so they pursued their losing strategy of "non-escalation" in relation to Ukraine. As a result, it cost them their pitical positions.

Currently, Putin is taking full advantage of claiming to his counterparts overseas that, before adting any changes to the Constitution, Ukraine must coordinate them with Russia. This is an attack on Ukraine’s identity and actorship, which can cause an internal split in Ukraine if such an issue is even brought up for general discussion.

And that’s what Putin expects. Ukraine's neutrality is not his real goal. His goal is domestic pitical destabilization caused by even "discussing" the possibility of neutrality, which would make Ukraine an easy prey for the Russian predator.

Thus, part of Ukrainian identity and actorship is the ability to independently choose a foreign picy develment vector and to decide whether to join – or not join – any pitical or military alliances. After all, Putin never asked the Ukrainian authorities about anything when he set up the CSTO or the SCO. Putin didn't ask anyone when staging what pretty much was a constitutional coup in Russia, snatching pitics out of Russia’s regions by cutting off any pitical processes within the Federation's subjects, as well as zeroing out his presidential terms in order to run for re-election. But “a deal’s a deal”, right? We never approve of the coup d'état in Russia, which Putin went for to retain power.

Thus, we should expect that the Ukrainian identity and actorship will be attacked during negotiations by imposing Russia’s agenda onto Ukraine: neutrality, concessions in the issue territorial integrity, legislative changes regarding the so-called "de-Nazification", and a cap on the size of the Armed Forces in the context of "demilitarization".

This is the negotiating package that, with a high degree of likelihood, Putin will bring to his talks with Donald Trump. The se purpose of this negotiation package is to inflict maximum damage on Ukrainian identity and actorship.

And so, this creates two paths for Ukraine. We either resist any concessions in this negotiation package and go on with armed confrontation indefinitely or devel communication tos for creating and strengthening a flexible core of narratives around our identity that would be detached from physical and material artifacts (like the “1991 border” thesis), while being able to give energy for strategically defeating not only Russia, but also to all the countries from the authoritarian axis (China – DPRK – Russia – Iran – Belarus – Venezuela – Cuba).

This, in fact, is Ukraine's global mission— to turn global history around after liberal-democratic leaders led it to an impasse.

Level 2: Repelling Russian aggression

Over the past six months, quite significant changes have taken place at this level. Since this level of confrontation reveals the nature of Ukraine's war with Russia as a fight for the very survival of the Ukrainian nation, its dynamics should be studied separately.

First, international experts are now beginning to come to terms with the fact that repelling Russian aggression in Ukraine is part of the global war with the autocratic axis mentioned above.

Secondly, Ukraine’s ongoing raid into Russia’s Kursk region proved that even a large-scale defeat Russian tros may suffer on the battlefield cannot be immediately converted into a shift in Russian picy or reshuffles in the Russian regime. There are no arguments to offer as to why Crimea would be more valuable to the Russian military and pitical leadership than part of Kursk region.

Thirdly, associating the effort to repel Russian aggression with Ukraine's territorial integrity and regaining contr of the border as of 1991 has proven inefficient in terms of strategic communication. While giving up on the idea of restoring territorial integrity is unacceptable, the communication of the goal of regaining contr of the borders as of 1991 looks unrealistic, only annoying partners. Therefore, the category of “victory” in the confrontation with Russia must be put on a more global level, and plenty of prosals have already been put forward in this regard.

Specifically, the desired finale of Ukraine's confrontation with Russia is Russia’s de-imperialization, deconization, and re-federalization, which was enshrined in the Eurean Parliament Resution of February 29, 2024. This can be achieved not only and not so much through military force.

Level 3: A war of civilizational choice between NATO and the USSR

NATO never showed up to the war of the wannabe USSR 2.0. with the "Western world". Despite the fact that Ukraine's NATO membership is one of the elements of the "Victory Plan" as Ukraine will never achieve any alternative security guarantees, identical to those enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that a number of Allies will be doing their utmost to block Ukraine from joining NATO.

As one of the Eurean experts wrote on Facebook, NATO may deploy its tros in Ukraine exclusively for the purpose of ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian Federation.

And, therefore, Ukraine’s neutrality will be preserved de facto, if not de jure. This suggests that we need to think of how we could use it not as Ukraine’s vulnerability, but as an portunity in talks, that is, to shift the responsibility for Ukraine’s neutrality from the Ukrainian military and pitical leadership and pele to the pitical leaders and communities of NATO Allies. After all, over the past 30 years since the signing of the Budapest Memorandum, the situation of Ukraine’s security is precisely the result of the foreign picy pursued by Western democracies, which allowed Russia to attack Ukraine in 2014 – and again, in 2022.

Thus, the issue of the de facto neutrality will not become a factor of destabilization within Ukraine, although it will inevitably increase anti-Western sentiments, and perhaps turn Ukrainians away from the West in general.

In fact, now the USSR is beating NATO on scorecards since NATO never showed up to the actual duel, while the revival of the USSR continues through pitical shifts in Georgia, partly in Mdova, and through the forced draft of Ukrainian citizens in the occupied territories into the Russian army, which, according to internal documents circulating in the Russian General Staff, poses NATO tros. Thus, North Koreans could potentially fight alongside Ukrainians against NATO forces. If this isn’t defeat, what is?

Level 4: Struggle between status quo and uncertain future

Uncertainty is one of the main enemies of pitical strategies. And therefore, the actor most skillfully erating amid uncertainty is able to achieve situational and systemic victories in the process of multi-level confrontation.

The liberal-democratic agenda of Western pitical elites has been very vulnerable to uncertainty because they scorned generating uncertainty on their own. For decades, Vladimir Putin has been persuaded that his "red line" demands are legitimate.

CIA Director Bill Burns himself admitted that he saw as convincing the threats of Kremlin pragandists to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. So the Russian side, which has been acting as a major generator and erator of uncertainty, has gained a systemic edge over the Western elites.

In addition, the Western elites systematically fear any unpredictable implications of Russia’s possible defeat. Therefore, to them, Russia's defeat in the war practically equals systemic uncertainty. By avoiding uncertainty, the Western elites also avoided any preconditions for Russia’s defeat. This way, they created grounds for Russia to prevail. In fact, they acted to the detriment of their societies because, in conditions of certainty, Putin will be able to put forward more and more demands, reducing the possibilities of geitical maneuvering by Western democracies.

However, after Donald Trump achieved a swiping win at the helm of the G, it can be cautiously expected that the strategy of at least one part of the Western world will revisit the so-called "strategic uncertainty", which may include arms transactions, large-scale sanctions (recall that it was Trump who imposed sanctions on Nord Stream 2 before Joe Biden lifted them), and even pitical assassinations. It was Donald Trump who authorized the strikes that killed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Qassem Seimani. Perhaps Vladimir Putin will not feel as safe anymore as he did during Biden’s term.

It should be accepted that Donald Trump will become a major generator of uncertainty, which will potentially destabilize the strategies of both Ukraine and Western Eure. However, at the same time, it will also destabilize Russia's strategies, which evens our chances. Also, Western Eure, with all due respect, should have been destabilized a long time ago, because their fear of losing the existing status quo has overshadowed their logical thinking.

As one of the Ukrainian experts recently td a Eurean negotiating team, "if Putin didn’t scare you, we he Trump will…"

Level 5: Strategic confrontation between the U.S. and China

It is clear that this level of confrontation is at risk of gaining maximum momentum and entailing shifts in all the other six levels of war. However, given Trump’s unpredictability and his capacity for transactional agreements based on cynical calculation, the relationship between the U.S. and China may acquire a certain balance that will rule out China's interest in such a destabilizing factor as Russia.

This means the Kremlin will st receiving systematic assistance from China to sustain its war effort against Ukraine and will thus be forced to make concessions.

However, there is also a certain probability of the reverse tion, where Trump tries to use the agreement with Russia to st its integration with China, which is already not going quickly and not as the Kremlin wishes.

One way or another, the focus on Ukraine will see a further downward trend because it is possible that during Trump's presidency he will have to resve conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region.

Level 6: Battle of the "World of Borders" and the "World of Roads"

The discussion of this dimension of confrontation traditionally requires a wider range of experts and consideration of various aspects and possibilities. The "World of Borders", that is, contr over large swaths of territory and the exercise of geitical influence through contrling territory remains a key agenda of the Kremlin authorities.

At the same time, the joint promotion of the "One Belt One Road" concept with China is a peculiar phenomenon, where the logistical geo-economic infrastructure serves as a to for promoting geitical values. Among other things, Vladimir Putin mentioned this in his speech at the Valdai Forum, interpreting the "One Belt – One Road" formula not as an element of physical space for the movement of goods. Putin pointed to the fact that the participants of this trade space will share common values ​​and visions of the future because this is not the "Chinese Road", but "One Road".

Thus, the task of Donald Trump, known for his ability to run tough negotiations in the context of protecting American business, will be to design such an approach to the processes of movement of goods in order to maximize profits of American corporations on the one hand by ening up trade portunities, and on the other hand to exert maximum pitical pressure on ponents through economic leverage.

It should be expected that decisions in this level will not always be favorable for Ukraine. However, at least they can be expected to be driven by cynical and logical reasons rather than hypocritical decisions like the Joe Biden administration's Nord Stream 2 restart.

It is highly likely that one of the key res in the confrontation between the worlds of borders and roads will be played by artificial intelligence (AI) develment and the ability of the most develed economies to create and implement the concept of such develment, which, on the one hand, will use AI’s "soft power" and its audience targeting by forming pele’s vision of the contexts of events and processes. And on the other hand, it will not allow AI to be shape a certain bias, instead pushing it to a full understanding of regional and multicultural contexts. In this process may lie a hitherto unexplored potential for gaining advantages at this level of war.

Level 7: The eternal battle between Good and Evil

Modern geitics conditions Ukraine's need for a new approach to self-determination and awareness of its own interests. The leadership of liberal-democratic Western forces in the develment of Ukrainian society has proven weak in a number of key existential issues.

The physical survival of Ukrainians does not depend on whether they take the side of "good" or "evil", but on how these categories are perceived by audiences relevant to Ukraine.

At the same time, we should keep in mind the certain ambivalence of a number of target audiences in the perception of "good" and "evil". Ukraine's strategy for survival and confronting domestic pitical challenges that may arise from the ceasefire processes must take into account what our partners consider "good" and "evil", and in what cases they resort to manipulation of these categories in order to achieve their mercantile goals.

Ukraine's experience of repelling Russian aggression has revealed deep weaknesses in the global security picy, which demonstrate the fallacy of the West's infantile approach to conflict resution. Nowadays, it is obvious that the picy of the great powers too often turns out toothless and focused on compromises rather than real problem sving. Therefore, the general agenda of the pitical landscape will inevitably "shift" further, as the elections in the EU and the USA have already proven.

Infantilism on the part of the West in relations with Russia is manifested in the lack of a clear and rigid strategy. Pledges of support, assurances of partnership remain only words, not flowed up by resute action, while sanctions resemble "movement without effect". Instead of striving to defeat the aggressor, Western picies, in particular those of the United States, expose a desire to settle the conflict, seeking compromises even when it contradicts the interests of not only Ukraine, but also the American pele.

The "we will support you for as long as it takes" rhetoric looks cynical against the background of Ukraine’s real needs being ignored, and the key approach to the conflict with Russia revving around pitical games, not the desire for victory.

Instead, it is worth focusing on the concepts of deconization and de-imperialization of Russia (not to be confused with Russia’s disintegration or clapse), which can form a basis for shifts in the Russian pitical system, the gradual destruction of Putin's "power vertical", and eventual re-federalization at the regional level.

It is important to realize that the Ukrainian victory is not about launching centrifugal processes within Russia, it’s about changing its internal structure. Ukraine will be able to achieve strategic stability on its borders only under the conditions of the actual destruction of Russian Empire’s pitical machine.

Global pitics, built on attempts to reach a compromise, has failed. The legacy of such approaches, dating back to the days of Henry Kissinger, has created a picy of "transactional relations" that has proven unsustainable in the face of today's realities. Coeration with Israel, participation in Middle Eastern conflicts, and support for allies such as Ukraine require not only symbic backing, but real decisions and actions. The problem is that great powers like the U.S. lack the drive to win; instead, they try to "put out fires" where clear answers are expected of them. With the change of pitical leadership in the USA, the situation may even worsen, although we will timistically believe in the best.

Ukraine cannot afford to depend on the situational decisions by great powers. We cannot expect that each successive U.S. president or EU leader will change their rhetoric in favor of Ukraine.

Obtaining real tos of influence, being aware of our own interests, being able to defend them, building a strategic plan and raising the stakes not only for adversaries, but also for partners — this is all key to our stability.

Thus, the debate surrounding commitment to "good" or "evil" acquires contrasting shades, which we have no right to be ashamed of. After all, it seems that being "good" but dead is a more losing strategy than pretending to be "evil" but alive.

An example of this approach is the picy pursued by Israel, which declared the UN Secretary General persona non grata. Perhaps radical sutions are not our path at this moment in time. But it’s high time to raise the discussion of the equality of ethical approaches to both adversaries and Western partners.

Survival requires that the Ukrainian pele not only repel the aggressor, but also leave behind any infantile hes that anyone else (Trump’s U.S. or Eure) might ensure peace and stability for Ukraine. This requires us to abandon naive expectations and get back to understanding that every victory is based on a realistic and pragmatic approach, frustration and heavy sacrifices, and not dependence on the interests of other states – which, incidentally, always converts into the same frustration and heavy sacrifices.

Dmytro Zotukhin

*The article was originally posted in Ukrainian on Detector Media and has been translated with author's permission.